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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Lena Page contends the district court erred when it denied her motion to suppress because
the officers had seized her while performing a welfare check, but they temporarily abandoned the
mission of that welfare check to ask questions related to the detection of potential criminal
activity.

As a result, everything the officers subsequently found during that unlawfully-

prolonged detention was fruit of the poisonous tree.
She also asserts that the district court erred by not addressing the second issue raised in
her motion to suppress, which was to suppress her pre-Miranda statements. 1 The video is clear
that Ms. Page was "in custody" at least when she was placed in handcuffs, though, given the
restrictions on her freedom of movement, she may have been "in custody" for Miranda purposes
earlier than that. As such, the order denying her motion to suppress in its entirety is mistaken
and this case should be remanded for the district court to consider that issue in the first instance.
Finally, Ms. Page contends the district court abused its discretion by not striking
objected-to information in the presentence report (hereinafter, PSI) even though the district court
indicated it would not consider that version of events because it had watched the video and it
knew what actually happened. The applicable legal standards are clear that, in such cases, the
district court needs to not only refuse to consider unreliable information in the PSI, but also
redline those portions of the PSI because there is a substantial risk not doing so will unfairly
prejudice the defendant in further proceedings.

1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ms. Page moved to suppress evidence in this case in two respects - she moved to
suppress the physical evidence on various grounds, and she moved to suppress her pre-Miranda
statements. (R., pp.115-16.) Officer Morey Wade testified he and Officer Jeff Fortner, his
training officer, were driving on a rural road around midnight when they saw a car driving
slowly on the shoulder of the road and shortly came to a stop. (Tr., p.15, L.10 - p.16, L.17, p.20,
Ls.23-24.) He did not see any erratic driving patterns. (Tr., p.17, Ls.13-21.) He pulled in
behind the car and activated his rear warning lights.

(Tr., p.16, Ls.18-24.)

Officer Wade

testified they were going to conduct an "officer assist." (Tr., p.17, Ls.22-25.)
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the district court admitted a video of the
encounter (Exhibit A) pursuant to a stipulation by the parties. 2 (Tr., p.9, L.12 - p.10, L.2.) At
the start of the video, Ms. Page was walking away from the police car back toward her own car.
(Exhibit A, 11:52:18.) She stopped abruptly as she reached the rear driver-side door and turned
back. (Exhibit A, ~ 11 :52:20.) A second or two later, an officer approached from the passenger
side of the police car. (Exhibit A, ~ 11 :52:21; see Tr., p.52, L.25 - p.53, L.2 (Trooper Fortner
testifying he was riding as a passenger in Trooper Wade's car).)

Trooper Fortner stopped

partway between the cars and Ms. Page had to walk back to meet him. (Exhibit A, ~11:52:24.)
Neither officer appeared to remember this part of the encounter, as both testified that Trooper
Wade was the first one to approach Ms. Page. (Tr., p.21, Ls.2-5, p.40, Ls.21 - p.41, L.3.)

2

While the officers also testified to their memory of the events, their memories differ in several
respects from what the video shows. As such, Ms. Page will refer primarily to what the video
shows actually happened. Citations to that video will include a reference to the timestamp
shown on the video. Quotations to the video are reproduced to the best of appellate counsel's
ability.
2

The video shows Ms. Page and Trooper Fortner appear to talk, 3 and she put her hands in
her pockets. (Exhibit A, ~11:52:35.) Trooper Fortner appeared to say something, and Ms. Page
quickly put her hands in the air, turned to face the back of her car, and stood with her legs apart.
(Exhibit A, ~ 11 :52:35.) The trooper said something else, Ms. Page turned her head to look at
him, and let her arms lower to her sides, but did not put her hands back in her pockets. (Exhibit
A, ~11:52:42.)

As she did so, Trooper Fortner appeared to say something else, and he

repositioned himself to stand with one foot in front of the other.

(Exhibit A, ~ 11 :52:44.)

Ms. Page responded by putting her hands back up. (Exhibit A, ~ 11 :52:44.) She eventually
lowered her hands, but kept them at approximately chest height.
At that point, Trooper Wade began to approach the pair, and as he did, Trooper Fortner
told him to "take her back here for a sec." (Exhibit A,~ 11 :53:07.) Officer Wade told Ms. Page,
"Okay, come with me." (Exhibit A, ~11:53:07.) She responded by saying, "You're scaring me."
(Exhibit A, ~ 11 :53:08.) Officer Wade told her, "We're just trying to see what's going on."
(Exhibit A, ~ 11 :53:09.) Ms. Page acquiesced and walked back toward the police car with
Officer Wade. (Exhibit A,~ 11 :53:09.)
Officer Wade started questioning Ms. Page, asking her, "What are you guys up to?"
(Exhibit A, ~ 11 :53: 15.) She responded that she and her passenger had driven down to the casino
to pick up a friend, but had been unable to find their friend. She also explained she and her
passenger stopped their car because "I was just going to let the car cool down, check the oil and
stuff" (Exhibit A, ~11:53:30.) The trooper asked if she had bene having car troubles lately, and
Ms. Page confirmed that she had. (Exhibit A, ~ 11 :53: 37.) He asked her for more details on how

3

There is no audio in the first portion of the video. (See generally Exhibit A.)
3

she knew the passenger. (Exhibit A, ~11:53:45.) Trooper Wade then asked, "You guys have
any drinks tonight?" and Ms. Page told him she only had a soda. (Exhibit A, ~ 11 :54:00.)
Trooper Wade proceed to explain, "We were just driving through. We noticed that you
guys are stopping out of nowhere and it kinda seemed a little suspicious. So, I mean, we're just
out here making sure everything's okay." (Exhibit A, ~11:54:12.) He then asked, "Do you
normally wear a glove on your right hand?" (Exhibit A, ~11:54:27.) Ms. Page explained she
does when she works on cars because she has bad reactions to the grease. Trooper Wade asked,
"Do you have anything on you that would, might, like any weapons?" (Exhibit A, ~11:45:55.)
Ms. Page noted that she had a screwdriver and lighters in her pockets and a knife in her jacket,
which was in the car. The trooper told her not to reach for any of those items.
Trooper Wade then asked, "How's your night going so far, then?"

(Exhibit A,

~11:55:23.) Ms. Page said alright, except that they had not found the person they were supposed
to pick up. The trooper asked her for more details on how she knew that friend. After a short
pause, Trooper Wade said, "Well, if we get some clear information, we just want to make sure
everything's okay.

Do you need any assistance with the car?"

(Exhibit A, ~11:56:08.)

Ms. Page told him she had a friend who lived nearby and she could go get him if necessary.
Officer Wade testified that, during this conversation, Ms. Page was friendly and compliant with
his instructions. (Tr., p.19, L.19 - p.20, L.2.)
Meanwhile, Trooper Fortner had been talking with the passenger and looking in the
driver side windows. (Tr., p.41, Ls.4-5; see generally Exhibit A.) After Ms. Page explained she
did not need help, he came over and asked if she had any identification. (Exhibit A, ~ 11: 56: 15.)
Ms. Page admitted she did not, but provided her name and birthdate. (See Tr., p.20, Ls.5-13
(Officer Wade also recalling it was he who asked for her identification).) Trooper Wade went to

4

run that information at that time, while Trooper Fortner stayed with Ms. Page. (See Tr., p.20,
Ls.14-16.) She mentioned the screwdriver to Trooper Fortner, pointing at her pocket she did so
(though not reaching for toward the pocket). (Exhibit A, ~11:58:15.) There were no audible
orders to keep her hands out of her pockets at that time. (See generally Exhibit A, ~11:58:15;
see generally Exhibit A (showing Ms. Page did not put her hands back in her pockets).)

Nevertheless, Officer Fortner testified that Ms. Page kept acting jittery and pacing
around, but the video shows she stayed in the same place, shifting her weight occasionally from
foot to foot. (Tr., p.43, Ls.15-16; e.g., Exhibit A, ~11:57:44, 11:57:58) He also testified that she
was repeatedly putting her hands in her pockets despite instructions, and he ultimately decided to
frisk her. (Tr., p.44, Ls.2-8; see also Tr., p.25, Ls.6-8 (Trooper Wade testifying to the same
facts)) He testified that this was based on a hunch, as she was "not being defiant, but just being
enough that it raises, you know, the hair on the back of my neck thinking something is just not
right." (Tr., p.43, Ls.15-19.)
He explained he saw a bulge in her front pocket and "wanted to verify, is that bulge what
she's telling us, you know ... that she had." (Tr., p.47, Ls.5-10.) The video shows Trooper
Fortner manipulating her pocket as he conducted the pat search. (Exhibit A,~ 11 :59:30.) During
the patdown, dispatch reported that Ms. Page's driver's license was suspended. (Exhibit A,
~ 12:00:00.) At that point, Officer Fortner put Ms. Page in handcuffs. The video shows Officer
Fortner continue to search Ms. Page, and, while searching her other pocket, in which she had a
wallet, something else fell out, and he exclaimed, "There we go!" (Exhibit A,~ 12:02:35; but see
Tr., p.48, Ls.19-20 (Officer Fortner testifying the baggie in question had fallen out when he was
pulling her lighter out of the other pocket).)

5

The State ultimately charged Ms. Page with possession of methamphetamine based on
the contents of the baggie. (R., pp.86-87.) She moved to suppress that evidence because, inter

alia, the initial detention could not be justified under the community caretaking exception to the
warrant requirement, and that the troopers had unlawfully extended the detention. (R., pp.14751, 153.) The district court concluded it was reasonable for the officers to see if Ms. Page
needed assistance given the driving pattern and the fact that, due to the narrowness of the
shoulder, the car stopped partially on the road. (R., pp.179-81.) It did not, however, address
whether the officers had unlawfully prolonged the detention while engaged in the welfare check.
(See generally R., pp.179-81.)
Instead, it concluded that their observations of her behavior during the welfare check
gave rise to a reasonable suspicion sufficient to start an investigatory detention. (R., pp.182-83.)
It also held that, in addition to her admission that she had a screwdriver was sufficient to create a
reasonable belief that she was armed and presently dangerous. (R., p.184.) As such, it denied
her motion to suppress. (R., p.184.) It did not discuss her alternative argument, that her pre-

Miranda statements should be suppressed. (See generally R., pp.177-84.)
Ms. Page subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea reserving her right to appeal the
order denying her motion to suppress. (Tr., p.75, Ls.4-8, p.84, Ls.17-20.) At the sentencing
hearing, defense counsel objected to the recitation of facts in the "Official Version" section of
the PSI, arguing the facts articulated there were contradicted by the video of the encounter.
(Tr., p.93, Ls.1-9.) The district court said, "I understand. And Ms. Page, it's just the police
report.

The police report is the police report. I watched the video. Just like what [defense

counsel] said, I know what happened." (Tr., p.93, Ls.10-14.) It did not, however, redline that
portion of the PSI, though it did redline other portions of the PSI where Ms. Page offered

6

clarifications. (Compare PSI, p.5, with PSI, pp.4, 11, 12, 15.) The district court ultimately
imposed a unified sentence of four years, with one year fixed, and suspended it for a period of
probation. (Tr., p.105, Ls.16-18.) Ms. Page filed a notice of appeal timely from the resulting
judgment of conviction. (R., pp.241, 252.)

7

ISSUES
I.

Whether the district court erred by denying Ms. Page's motion to suppress since the
video of the encounter shows the troopers temporarily abandoned the mission of the
welfare check for two minutes, thereby unlawfully prolonging the warrantless detention.

II.

Whether the district court erred by failing to address Ms. Page's motion to suppress the
unwarned statements she made during the encounter.

III.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by not redlining objected-to portions of
the PSI that section even though the district court indicated it would not consider those
facts because they were not reliable.

8

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred By Denying Ms. Page's Motion To Suppress Since The Video Of The
Encounter Shows The Troopers Temporarily Abandoned The Mission Of The Welfare Check
For Two Minutes, Thereby Unlawfully Prolonging The Warrantless Detention

A.

Standard Of Review
The standard for the appellate court's review of an order denying a motion to suppress is

bifurcated. State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 607 (2016). The appellate court will accept the trial
court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. 4 Id. However, it will freely review the
application of the constitutional principles to the facts of the case. Id.

B.

The District Court Implicitly, But Correctly, Found That Ms. Page Was Detained By The
Officers At The Outset Of The Encounter
In discussing the initial stages of the encounter, the district court found "the detention

was warranted" because "it was reasonable for Troopers Wade and Fortner to stop and inquire if
the Defendant was in need of assistance." (R., pp.180-81 (emphasis added).) While it is true
that, normally, "where an officer merely approaches a person who is standing on the street, or
seated in a non-moving vehicle located in a public place and poses a few questions, no seizure
has occurred," a Fourth Amendment seizure will still occur in such situations if "'the police

4

Any of the district court's findings of fact which are inconsistent with the video of the
encounter captured by the officers' dash camera are obviously not supported by substantial and
competent evidence, and therefore, are clearly erroneous. See Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho
322, 326 (2003) (defining when a factual finding is clearly erroneous); see also State v.
Anderson, 164 Idaho 309, _ , 429 P.3d 850, 853 (2018) (identifying an exception to the
bifurcated stand of review - that when the appellate court has exactly the same information as
the district court (namely, the video of the encounter and the officer's preliminary hearing
testimony), the appellate court will not defer to the district court's factual fmdings, but instead,
will freely review and weigh the evidence as a trial court would do).
9

conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that was not at liberty to ignore the
police presence and go about his business."' State v. Osborne, 121 Idaho 520, 523-24 (Ct. App.
1991) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991)). Therefore, to conclude that there
was a detention which needed justification under the Fourth Amendment (R., pp.180-81 ), the
distinct court necessarily had to conclude that a reasonable person in Ms. Page's situation would
not have felt free to disregard the officers' instructions and go about her business.
That conclusion is supported by the record, which shows that a reasonable person would
not have felt free to ignore the troopers due to their repeated shows of authority, given the
totality of the circumstances. '"[A] person is 'seized' only when, by means of physical force or a
show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained."' State v. Agundis, 127 Idaho 587,
592 (Ct. App. 1995) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980)). "An
officer's verbal request or command can amount to a seizure of a person if, in view of all the
circumstances surrounding the incident, the command would cause a reasonable person to
believe that he was not free to leave and the person accedes to the command." State v. Zuniga,
143 Idaho 431, 434 (Ct. App. 2006).
From the outset, Officer Fortner acted in a way which constituted a show of authority and
restrained Ms. Page's freedom of movement.

The video from the dash camera begins with

Ms. Page walking away from the officers back toward her car. (Exhibit A, 11 :52: 18.) As neither
officer testified to instructing her to go back to her car,5 her behavior in that regard suggests that
she did, initially, feel free to disregard their presence.

5

However, the video shows that she

In fact, both officers testified that she simply walked up to meet Officer Wade in between the
two cars. (See Tr., p.21, Ls.2-5, p.40, Ls.21 - p.41, L.3.) Those recollections are clearly
mistaken, since not only was she walking away, her initial encounter was with Officer Fortner,
not Officer Wade. (See Exhibit A,~ 11 :52:20.)

10

stopped short at the rear driver’s side door of her car as Officer Fortner got out of their car.
(Exhibit A, ~11:52:20.) Her behavior in that moment – abruptly stopping her movement to turn
back to the officers – certainly indicates there was some instruction for her to wait a moment. A
reasonable person would not have felt free to disregard that instruction. State v. Cardenas, 143
Idaho 903, 905, 908 (Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the person, who was walking from his car
toward a house, was seized when the officer instructed him that he “needed to come speak to [the
deputy]” and he turned and came back to the officers) (alteration from original); see also
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983) (holding that the person’s refusal to listen or answer
the officer’s consensual questions does not furnish the officers with grounds to detain him and
force him to answer). The fact that Officer Fortner stopped between the cars, which meant
Ms. Page had to come back to where he was standing, only reinforced the perception that he was
exercising his authority, that he was in control of the situation, and Ms. Page was not free to
disregard him. (See Exhibit A, ~11:52:24.)
Trooper Fortner made additional shows of authority in the way he handled Ms. Page
putting her hands in her pockets during that initial encounter. When Ms. Page put her hands in
her pockets, Trooper Fortner appears to make a comment, and Ms. Page’s reaction was to
quickly put her hands in the air, turn toward the car, and stand with her legs apart, almost like she
expected him to frisk her. (Exhibit A, ~11:52:35.) That demonstrates the officer’s comment was
a command. Additionally, when she let her hands go back down to her sides, Trooper Fortner
said something else, and this time, he shifted into a tenser stance, one foot behind the other.
(Exhibit A, ~11:52:42.)

Ms. Page’s reaction was to put her hands back up.

(Exhibit A,

~11:52:44.) That continues to show Trooper Fortner exercising his control over the situation,
and a reasonable person would not have felt free to disregard him, particularly given the officer’s

11

change in stance. Compare Zuniga, 143 Idaho at 434 (explaining that the fact that the officer
pursued the defendant when he fled the scene showed just how reasonable it was for a reasonable
person to have understood he was not free to disregard the officer’s instructions).
However, the clearest show of authority came when Officer Wade finally approached the
pair. As he got close, Officer Fortner told him to “take her back here for a sec.” (Exhibit A,
~11:53:07.) Officer Wade then told Ms. Page, “Okay, come with me.” (Exhibit A, ~11:53:07.)
Thus, they were clearly constraining her movements at that point in the stop.
Moreover, Ms. Page’s reaction to those commands shows that a reasonable person would
not feel free to leave. Specifically, she told the officers, “You’re scaring me.” (Exhibit A,
~11:53:08.) Officer Wade responded, “We’re just trying to see what’s going on.” (Exhibit A,
~11:53:09.) At that point, Ms. Page acquiesced and walked back toward the police car, away
from her car, with Officer Wade. (Exhibit A, ~11:53:09.) This sequence of events – to have an
officer escort her further away from her vehicle at the express direction of the other officer –
would definitely convey to a reasonable person that they were not free to leave, particularly one
who was standing on a rural roadside at night and having car problems. Compare Zuniga, 143
Idaho at 434; see also State v. Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823, 828 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the
person was not seized when the officers approached the parked car and asked him to shut it off,
but he was seized when the officer told him to remain seized).
Since a reasonable person would not have felt free, given the totality of the circumstances
shown in the dash camera video, to disregard the officers’ instructions and leave, the district
court properly concluded the initial encounter involved a seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.

12

C.

Since, For Nearly Two Minutes, The Officers Were Not Addressing The Mission Of The
Welfare Check, They Unlawfully Prolonged The Warrantless Seizure
For the community caretaker exception to justify a warrantless detention, "the officer's

activity must be one that is 'totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of
evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute."' State v. Osborne, 121 Idaho 520, 526
(Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)).

As such, that

exception only applies if the officers "perceive a medical emergency or other exigency
compelling immediate action." State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 104 (Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis
added); accord State v. Schmidt, 137 Idaho 301, 304 (Ct. App. 2002).

In other words,

"[ c] ommunity caretaking justifies a detention only if there is a present need for assistance."
State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 825 (Ct. App. 2002) (emphasis added).

As the Maddox Court made clear, extending the community caretaking exception beyond
those well-established bounds would be improper because allowing officers to do more during a
welfare check "would present far too great an opportunity for pretextual stops and far too great
an imposition on the privacy interest of our citizenry to comport with the Fourth Amendment."
Id. In fact, it was this same sort of concern that led the United States Supreme Court to hold that

a detention "may last no longer than necessary to effectuate [the] purpose" of the detention.
Rodriguez v. United States, _

U.S. _ , 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) (internal quotation

omitted). Rather, when a warrantless seizure is initiated, the officer must act "to confirm or
dispel his suspicions quickly." United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985).
As such, if the officer temporarily abandons the mission of the detention to pursue other
investigations, that violates the seized person's Fourth Amendment rights. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct.
at 1614; accord Linze, 161 Idaho at 608. This is equally applicable to detentions to conduct
welfare checks. See State v. McAfee, 116 Idaho 1007, 1010 (Ct. App. 1989). Specifically, the
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McAfee Court explained, "[a] lthough the officers may well have had a community caretaking
basis to inquire as to McAfee' s welfare, the record reflects no such inquiry before McAfee was
ordered out of the vehicle. In so ordering, the police effected a seizure without the constitutional
required articulable suspicion." Id.; see also United States v. Lee, Cr. No. 17-120 WES, 2018
WL 3873668, **4-5 (D.R.I. Aug. 15, 2018), slip copy (a federal district court judge expressly
applying the principles articulated in Rodriguez to welfare-check detentions). 6
Here, as in McAfee, the officers did not immediately address the mission of the welfare
check, and so, that could not serve as a justification for the warrantless seizure. Specifically, the
dash camera video shows that, during the first two minutes of the encounter, the officers,
particularly Trooper Wade, were not pursuing the mission of the welfare check, and instead,
were trying to detect potential criminal violations.

Therefore, the community caretaker

justification did not justify that portion of the detention.
For example, Trooper Wade's first question to Ms. Page was not "are you all right," or
"do you need help," such as to find out whether she was in immediate need of assistance.

Compare Lee, 2018 WL 3873668 at **1, 4 (noting that the officer addressed the mission of the
welfare check within the first few seconds by asking whether the defendant , needed a medical

6

It appears that, given the recency of the decision in Lee, that case is still pending in the federal
district court. See generally Lee, 2018 WL 3873668. As such, it is cited here only as an
example of how one court has dealt with legal questions similar to those presented in this case.
Compare Staff of Idaho Real Estate Comm 'n v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 634 (2001) (quoting
Bourgeois v. Murphy, 119 Idaho 611, 617 (1991)) ("When this Court had cause to consider
unpublished opinions from other jurisdictions because an appellant had discussed the cases in his
petition, we found the presentation of the unpublished opinions as 'quite appropriat[ e].'
Likewise, we find the hearing officer's consideration of the unpublished opinion, not as binding
precedent but as an example, was appropriate.").
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rescue, given that he had been sleeping in a parked car and said he was not feeling well). 7
Rather, Trooper Wade's first question was "what are you guys up to?" (Exhibit A, ~11:53:15.)
This distinction is important because the indication in the question Trooper Wade actually asked
was that, to be out on that road at that time of night, Ms. Page must have been doing something
untoward. In fact, Trooper Wade made it clear that was exactly his point a little later, when he
told Ms. Page, "We were just driving through. We noticed that you guys are stopping out of
nowhere and it kinda seemed a little suspicious." (Exhibit A, ~11:54:12 (emphasis added).) In
fact, he seemed to realize the implications of his admission in that regard, and quickly added,
"So, I mean, we're just out here making sure everything's okay." (Exhibit A, ~11:54:13.)
Trooper Wade's next question did not return to the mission of the welfare check, but
instead pro bed Ms. Page's answer to the first question, as he asked about her relationship with
her passenger. (Exhibit A, ~11:53:45.) His third question more directly aimed at trying to detect
potential criminal violations, as he asked "You guys have any drinks tonight?" (Exhibit A,
~ 11 :54:00.)
Despite turning back in the direction of the mission of the welfare check after trying to
investigate a DUI (see Exhibit A, ~11:54:13), Trooper Wade still did not actually seek to
confirm or deny his suspicions about whether Ms. Page was in need of immediate assistance with
her car. Instead, he asked, "Do you normally wear a glove on your right hand?" (Exhibit A,
~11:54:27.) Ms. Page responded that she was wearing it to protect herself while working on the
engme.

7

The continuation of the seizure in that case was justified by the officer's observations of the
defendant while they were actively pursuing the mission of the welfare check. Lee, 2018 WL
3873668, *4-5.
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Trooper Wade’s next question was not in regard to Ms. Page’s welfare, but his own: “Do
you have anything on you that would, might, like any weapons?” (Exhibit A, ~11:45:55.)
Certainly an officer has the ability to ensure his own safety while conducting a welfare check.
See State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491, 495 (1991); see also Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614 (noting
that, while addressing the mission of the detention, the officer can attend to “related safety
concerns”). However, as Trooper Wade testified, Ms. Page was being cooperative and friendly
during their conversation. (Tr., p.19, L.19 - p.20, L.2.) As such, even if she were armed, there
was no indication at that point that she represented a present danger to the officers. See State v.
Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 662 (2007) (holding that, while the officer knew the defendant was
armed, a frisk was not permissible because the officer “did not testify to any fact that
demonstrated [the defendant] presented a potential threat to him or others and, in fact,
acknowledged that [the defendant] was in no way threatening to him”). Therefore, there was no
attendant safety concern to actually address before addressing the actual mission of the welfare
check and finding out if Ms. Page was in need of immediate assistance.
Trooper Wade’s next questions returned to his initial line of investigation, as he asked
Ms. Page, “How’s your night going so far, then?” (Exhibit A, ~11:55:23.) He followed up on
that question with more questions about her relationship with the friend she said they had gone to
pick up at the casino.
It was not until Ms. Page had answered all these other questions that Trooper Wade
finally, two minutes into the encounter, asked the question relevant to the mission of the welfare
check: “Do you need any assistance with the car?” (Exhibit A, ~11:56:09.) Since Trooper
Wade spent two minutes asking questions which were not related to whether Ms. Page was in
immediate need of assistance, he took more time than was necessary to address the mission of
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the welfare check- to confirm or dispel his suspicions that Ms. Page's car was broken down and
she needed help. Therefore, the warrantless detention was impermissibly prolonged and violated
Ms. Page's Fourth Amendment rights.
As a result, all the observations the officers made about Ms. Page's behavior during that
unlawfully-prolonged detention were tainted. As such, the ensuing investigatory detention based
on those observations was tainted.

Therefore, evidence discovered during that tainted

investigation were fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been suppressed. See State v.

Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 32 (2017) (reaffirming that the appellate courts are only concerned with
what the officers actually did, not with what they might have otherwise lawfully done had they
not actually violated the person's constitutional rights).

II.
The District Court Erred By Failing To Address Ms. Page's Motion To Suppress The Unwarned
Statements She Made During The Encounter
A.

Standard Of Review
As this issue also deals with the denial of a motion to suppress, the standard articulated in

Section I(A), supra, is also applicable here.

B.

This Case Should Be Remanded So That The District Court Can Actually Address
Ms. Page's Meritorious Motion To Suppress Her Pre-Miranda Statements
It is clear that Ms. Page was "in custody" for Miranda purposes at the point Officer

Fortner placed her in handcuffs upon hearing her driver's license was suspended. See State v.

Pannell, 127 Idaho 420, 424 (1995). She was not informed of her rights at that time. (See
Exhibit A, ~ 12:00:00; see also Tr., p.30, Ls.6-11 (Trooper Wade recalling Ms. Page was not read
her rights until she had been placed in the back of the police car).) As such, her statements, at
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least from that point, needed to be suppressed. Therefore, the district court's decision to deny
her motion without exception was erroneous.
However, Ms. Page may have actually been "in custody" earlier than that moment. As
discussed in Section I(B), supra, the district court properly concluded that Ms. Page had been
detained at the outset of this encounter, and they specifically ordered her to go stand with
Trooper Wade away from her car. The Court of Appeals has explained that, while not every
detention requires Miranda warnings, it is equally true that "[a] person need not be under arrest
to be 'in custody' for Miranda purposes." State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 363 (Ct. App.
2000). In that case, as here, the district court only ruled on the defendant's Fourth Amendment
challenge, and not his Fifth Amendment issue. Id. The Parkinson Court held that the Miranda
issue should be decided by the district court in the first instance on remand. Id. (noting that case
also needed to be remanded for other reasons).

That is consistent with the Idaho Supreme

Court's perspective, which is that, because the district court is the finder of fact, when it fails to
address an issue, the case should be remanded for it to address the issue and make whatever
factual findings are necessary. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 14 7 Idaho 1, 6-7 (2009).
So, too, this Court should vacate the order denying Ms. Page's motion and remand this
matter so the district court can rule on her Miranda challenge in the first instance.

III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Redlining Objected-To Portions Of The PSI
That Section Even Though The District Court Indicated It Would Not Consider Those Facts
Because They Were Not Reliable
A.

Standard Of Review
The district court's denial of an objection to portions of a PSI is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950, 961 (Ct. App. 2010). A district court abuses its
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discretion when (1) it fails to recognize the issue as one of discretion; (2) it acts beyond the outer
bounds of its discretion; (3) it acts inconsistently with the applicable legal standards, or (4) it
reaches its decision without exercising reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 86364 (2018).

B.

The Applicable Legal Standards Are Clear That, When The District Court Concludes
Information In The PSI Is Not Reliable, It Is Not Sufficient For The District Court, As It
Did Here, To Just Ignore That Information Without Also Redlining That Information In
The PSI
In noting various issues with the information in the PSI, defense counsel specifically

objected to the recitation of facts in the "Official Version" section, arguing they were not reliable
because they were contradicted by the video from the dash camera. (Tr., p.93, Ls.1-9.) The
district court indicated that it agreed that at least some of those facts were unreliable and it would
not be relying on them because "I watched the video," and "I know what happened." (Tr., p.93,
Ls.10-14.) It did not, however, redline that section of the PSI. (See PSI, p.5; compare PSI, pp.4,
11, 12, 15 (the district court making notations of other corrections on the PSI itself).) The Court
of Appeals has actually addressed a similar situation and held that, while the district court had
correctly refused to consider the unreliable information, it still committed reversible error by not
also striking that unreliable information from the PSI. Molen, 148 Idaho at 961.
The reason that unreliable information needs to be affirmatively striking from the PSI is
that "the use of a PSI does not end with the defendant's sentencing. The report goes to the
Department of Correction[] and may be considered by the Commission of Pardons and Parole in
evaluating the defendant's suitability for parole. In addition, if the defendant reoffends, any
prior PSI is usually presented to the sentencing court with an update report from the presentence
investigator." State v. Rodriguez, 132 Idaho 261, 262 n.1 (Ct. App. 1998). Moreover, "the
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timeframe for alterations of the report is explicitly tied to the sentencing hearing; it is at the
sentencing hearing—and not beyond—that the defendant is given the opportunity to object to its
contents.” State v. Person, 145 Idaho 293, 296 (Ct. App. 2007). That means “a district court’s
authority to change the contents of a PSI ceases once a judgment of conviction and sentence are
issued.” Id. Therefore, this one and only opportunity to correct the PSI needs to be employed,
since, in short, “a PSI follows a defendant indefinitely, and information inappropriate included
therein may prejudice the defendant even if the initial sentencing court disregarded such
information.” Rodriguez, 132 Idaho at 262 n.1.
That rule does not mean that the district court is required to redline every point which a
defendant challenges. See, e.g., State v. Carey, 152 Idaho 720, 722 (Ct. App. 2012). It does,
however, mean that, “where the trial court was rejecting information in the PSI as unfounded or
unreliable, it is insufficient to simply disregard the information at sentencing and, instead, the
court should also redline it from the PSI so that this information could not prejudice the
defendant in the future.”

Id.

Since the district court in this case was disregarding the

information in the “Official Version” section as unreliable based on what the video showed, it
did not act consistent with the applicable legal standards by not also redlining that section of the
PSI.
These legal standards also make it clear that the district court’s suggestion – that, because
the presentence author was only repeating the information from the police reports, the recitation
of those facts in the PSI was permissible (see Tr., p.93, Ls.11-12) – is incorrect. Rather, as the
Idaho Supreme Court has explained, “The fact that much of the information came from the files
of the United States Attorney’s office does not mean that it is per se reliable.” State v. Mauro,
121 Idaho 178, 183 (1991). Therefore, the Mauro Court remanded the case so that a corrected
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PSI, one without the improper information, could be obtained. Id. (also vacating the sentence
since the district court in that case had relied on the improperly-included information).
Here, as in Molen and Mauro, this case should also be remanded so that the PSI can be
corrected, particularly since this is Ms. Page's only opportunity to get it corrected.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Page respectfully requests this Court reverse the order denying her motion to
suppress, vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this case for further proceedings.
Alternatively, she respectfully requests this Court remand this case so that the unreliable
information can be stricken from her PSI.
DATED this 2nd day of May, 2019.
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